The concept of revolution as radical and fundamental political innovation was unknown to antiquity and the middle ages. Professor Grieswank, who at the time of his death in 1853 was Dean of the Philosophical Faculty in the University of Jena (German Democratic Republic—East Germany), here traces the emergence of the modern concept of revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Emergence of the Concept of Revolution

KARL GRIEWANK

The word revolution entered the domain of political thought proper by way of natural philosophy [science]. The growing importance of the word for astronomy, and for science generally, coupled with an inclination to fit each change of the heavenly bodies into an astrophysical or scientific scheme, helped to make the word revolution an ever more popular term and paved the way for its introduction into the language of politics. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theorists were very prone to link both the name and the course of every kind of cosmically-determined upheaval with that regular circulation of the firmaments to which Nicholas Coper- nichus had devoted his principal work, De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium [On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies]. People were taking it for granted that the world they lived in was full of change. They could detect change most readily in political affairs, but there was no mistaking it in religion, music, institutions and inventions as well. Often, a change in religion was often the evident cause of political change. Scientists, political theorists, and statesmen alike were to occupy themselves with the question of how these changes, the decisive and sweeping political changes especially, were related to the motions of the heavens. So sober a thinker as Bodin did not disdain such endeavors (nor did the brilliant Jo- hannes Kepler). Kepler had, through observation and mathematics, discovered the laws of planetary motion, the foundation of celestial mechanics, which had hitherto been inaccessible to the purely speculative Aristotelian conceptions that had prevailed. Yet this same Kepler, for all that he fought against the superstitions pseudo-philosophy of the astrologers, constantly tried to puzzle out in what way the fluctuations in the affairs of men were connected with the motions of stars and constellations, believing as he did that the creator had instilled the same geometry and harmony into all things, creatures possessed of a soul and heavenly bodies alike. This pioneer of the new physto-mathemat- ical science sought justification for his intellectual longings in a speculative system deriving from Platonic and Neo-Platonic ideas, a system in which earthly creatures and heavenly bodies were un- brazed in a single universal harmony and were also jointly subject to disturbances. He associated the appearance of

From Karl Grieswank, Der Neusprachliche Revolutionenbegriff (Witten: 1955), pp. 171-182. Translated by Helina Lehman with permission of the publishers, Hermann Hohst Nottbohm. With one exception, the notes have been omitted. Reprinted with permission of The Macmillan Company, New York, from Revolutions in Modern European History, Helina Lehman (ed.), copyright © 1968 by Helina Lehman, pp. 55-61.
EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

Ronald St. John suggests that the concept of revolution emerged as a response to the Enlightenment's emphasis on progress and the natural rights of individuals. This was particularly evident in the French Revolution, which sought to overthrow the absolute monarchy and establish a more democratic society. The concept of revolution became a tool to justify political change, and it was used to justify the overthrow of monarchies and the establishment of republics. This concept spread across Europe, influencing the revolutions in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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The third of freedom by which God's blessing rested. In just the same way Charles VIII of France, upon the overthrow of the Medici in 1494, had himself fitted as the restorer and protector of the freedom of Florence (temptator et protector libertate florentinae). In all these instances the concept of the cycle was employed for the purpose of justifying a new state of affairs which, following upon an upheaval, was looked on as final.

But the concept of revolution which autonomy had made familiar did not remain restricted to such conservative usage in the quest for tranquillity and permanence and, thus, in a restoratice sense. It would in fact be completely wrong to ascribe the introduction of the concept of revolution into politics and statecraft to astrological speculations and astronomical parallels exclusively, or even to regard those as having played a decisive and enshrining role in the transmission of the concept. At a time when political thinking was becoming more flexible, the term political mind could see a variety of possible applications for the simple notion of the word revolution, rotating (Umdrehung, Umlaufnahme).

In the seventeenth century the word revolution was already linked with that objective, non-evolutionary conception of transformation built upon by Machiavelli on the base of chemical models, and subsequently extended to the social realm—either, once again, with the concept of political change underlies the words which the Duke de Rohan used in dedicating his Histoire des Princes et Etats de le Chrétienté to Richelieu in 1634, a conception of change that is no longer hedged by fixed conditions and that bases itself in the face of every known piece of political wisdom, ancient or medieval. "Whatever it is that causes the cyclical revolutions of the things of this world, also causes the basic principles of good government to change."

Revolution here becomes synonymous with reversal and alteration in things political, and with alteration in the world generally. The word revolution replaces the old term restoration, renovation, conversion, and change to denote alterations that have taken place or are taking place on the objective plane; and though it does not denote subjective manifestations such as intransigence and conspiracies, still it carries with it that abruptness of movement and movement which attaches to it from earlier and vulgar usage. Thenceforward the word revolution becomes the standard term for the doctrine of political and worldly change whose emergence we have been able to trace from the sixteenth century on.

The most important step in the history of the term was the event which peremptorily introduced the word revolution into historical writing and political theory—the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In contrast to the period of the civil war (1640-1689), which had been introduced into historiography by its first historian, Chronicon, as the "Great Rebellion," the later event, which brought about lasting political changes with far less internal turmoil, was to be regarded as a counterrevolution to the restoratice concept of revolution held by Clarendon and Hobbes: a victorious Parliament was snatching, with its hands of a king who had usurped the laws of the land, from the hands of a king in flight, the very concept of revolution that had been used in behalf of his predecessors! In the same way the concept of restoration, which had hitherto been used by rebels, in Florence and then in London, to signify a "restoration of liberty," had subsequently been turned against them and used in behalf of the restored monarch.

The Settlement of 1668-89 was not an act of reversal. It was the confirmation of a kind of constitution, a state of affairs which Parliament considered it essential to legitimize in accord with all existing principles of English law, historical and natural. It was, therefore, a revolution, taking which had led to yet another reverse: the Glorious Revolution of this kind was termed glorious because of its successful outcome; the critiques of biographical and political apologists for William of Orange thought it important to call his domestic and foreign policy illustrious because it was successful. By calling it "the Glorious Revolution" they meant that it was really just one more change of sovereign, albeit one that had taken place in circumstances reflecting glory on the king and on the nation represented in Parliament. An apologetic text in Latin, published in Leiden, correctly translated the phrase into the ancient word: "iusvan nostrae returum concordiae" or "rerum concordiae." "La dernière Révolution d'Angleterre" (English's latest revolution)—with this phrase one more change was added to a long line of changes.

For all that, the Glorious Revolution constituted a new point of departure for the political significance of the concept of revolution. The application of the word revolution to this event may be regarded as a counterrevolution to the restoratice concept of revolution held by Clarendon and Hobbes: a victorious Parliament was snatching, with its hands of a king who had usurped the laws of the land, from the hands of a king in flight, the very concept of revolution that had been used in behalf of his predecessors! In the same way the concept of restoration, which had hitherto been used by rebels, in Florence and then in London, to signify a "restoration of liberty," had subsequently been turned against them and used in behalf of the restored monarch.

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On the Etiology of Internal Wars

HARRY ECKSTEIN

Nor does it mean quite the same thing as certain more commonly used terms, such as revolution, civil war, revolt, rebellion, uprising, guerrilla warfare, mutiny, insurgency, coup d'etat, terrorism, or insurrection. It stands for the genus of which the others are species.

Using the generic concept alongside, or even in place of, the more specific terms is justifiable on several grounds.

1 Elsewhere I have used more cumbersome specifications for the term, holding that internal war is "a kind of social force that is executed in the pursuit of political compete- tion, deviating from previously shared social norms, 'without' in character (that is, conducted practically without normally observed normative rules), and involving the serious disruption of civil institu- tional patterns." Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York, 1984), 12. The differences between the two formulations are due to the fact that here I am defining a term, whereas in the essay above I was (literally) a theoretical concept. (For what I mean by defining a theoretical concept, see ibid., 8–12.) I was guided in the Center for International Studies at Princeton University for supporting the work that went into this study is part of a widening set of inquiries into internal war. The Center's internal war studies, in turn, have been sup- ported by grants from the Carnegie Foundation. Another, very different, version of the paper was published in a report prepared by the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., Social Science Research and National Security (government comment only).

2 For example, in Pierre Kropotkin, Pensees d'un révolté, ed. by Eliaze Reba (Paris, not dated, but circa 1888). The term was used by Count Friesen as early as 1790 and occurs else- where in the writings of Moreau and the Federick Papers.