MODERNIZING WOMEN

Gender & Social Change in the Middle East

Valentine M. Moghadam
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Contents

List of Illustrations ix
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xi
Preface xiii
Note on Transliteration and the Iranian Calendar xvi

1 Introduction and Overview: Recasting the Middle East 1
   The Debate on the Status of Arab-Islamic Women, 3
   Assessing Women’s Status, 7
   Diversity in the Middle East, 10
   A Framework for Analysis:
   Gender, Class, the State, Development, 14
   Social Changes and Women in the Middle East, 19

2 Economic Development, State Policy, and Women’s Employment 29
   The Internationalization of Capital and the Middle East, 32
   The Political Economy of the Middle East, 35
   Industrialization and Female Proletarianization, 37
   Characteristics of the Female Labor Force, 43
   State Policies and Women’s Status, 53
   Integration or Marginalization:
   Development and the Status of Women, 63
   Conclusions, 65

3 Modernizing Women: Reforms, Revolutions, and the Woman Question 69
   Bringing Women into the Study of Revolution, 72
   The Tanzimat Reforms and
   the Kemalizat Revolution in Turkey, 79
   National Liberation, Revolution, and Gender in Algeria, 83
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Women, Patriarchy, and the Changing Family</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Patriarchal Society and the Extended Household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Neopatriarchal State and Personal Status Laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Middle Eastern Muslim Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Demographic Transition and the Family:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Change and the Family:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Significance of Education</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Islamist Movements and Women's Responses</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Causes and Social Bases of Islamist Movements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gharbadeji: Problematics of Class and Gender</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Status Laws and the Control of Women</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women and Islamist Movements: Some Cases</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions: Women's Responses to Islamist Movements</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Inequality, Accommodation, Resistance</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological Images of Women and the Sex/Gender System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contradictions of the Islamist Discourse</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population, Sex Ratio, Fertility</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literacy and Education</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fertility, Education, and Employment: The Connections</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development Imperatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Ideological Contradictions</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Empowerment of Islamist Women</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Women and Social Change in Afghanistan</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghan Social Structure and Its Implications for Women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan: Protype of a Weak State</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Reforms Concerning Women</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characteristics of Afghan Patriarchy</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The PDPA and Women's Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conclusion: All That Is Solid Is Melting into Air</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Bibliography</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Book and Author</td>
<td>311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3

Modernizing Women: Reforms, Revolutions, and the Woman Question

*The proletariat cannot achieve complete freedom unless it achieves complete freedom for women.* — Lenin

*Woman was transformed in this society so that a revolution could occur.* — Iranian magazine editorial

Around the world, changes in women’s status have come about through a combination of long-term macrolevel change processes (industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, education, and employment) and collective action (social movements and revolutions). In the context of both socioeconomic development and political change, legal reforms have been pursued to improve the status of women in the family and in the society. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia provides the first historical example of sweeping legal reform in favor of women. Here the leadership adopted an official discourse of sexual equality and enacted policies of affirmative action, quotas, and political education that many countries subsequently emulated. In Scandinavia the welfare state plays an important role in relieving women of some of the responsibilities of child care and other forms of care-giving, releasing them for employment and participation in formal politics. In the former German Democratic Republic, a policy of combating sex discrimination, indeed of discrimination in favor of women, was in place from 1949 until the demise of the GDR in 1990. Elsewhere, revolutionary movements and developmentalist, welfare states—both socialist and neosocialist—have been crucial agents of the advancement of women, promoting reforms in family law, encouraging education and employment, and formulating social policies intended to facilitate women’s participation in public life.

In many Third World countries, including Middle Eastern ones, concepts of the emancipation of women emerged in the context of national lib-
eration, state-building, and self-conscious attempts to achieve modernity in the early part of the century. In many cases, male feminists were instrumental in highlighting the woman question. Among the earlier generation of male women’s rights advocates are Qa'as in (author of the 1901 study The New Woman) and Muhammad Abduh (1834-1905); Turkey’s Ziya Okalap and Mustafa Kemal; Afghanistan’s Mahmoud Tarzi (1856-1935); Iraq’s Jamal Sudi Azza Khawr (who in 1911 advocated doing away with the veil); and Iran’s Makmun Khar (who in an 1890 issue of his journal, Qasere [Law], wrote an article advocating women’s education). Many other intellectuals, inspired by socialist or liberal political thought, advocated unveiling women and liberating them through education. In most cases, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, these ideas were used to call for revolt against corrupt, feudalistic governments. In the post—World War II period, integrating women into national development may have been an objective for many male reformers. In post-independence Tunisia, President Habib Bourguiba replaced Islamic family law (based on the Sharia) with a civil law code regulating personal and family relations and equating the responsibilities of the sexes. Polygamy and unilateral male divorce were abolished, and the state assumed a strong stance in favor of female emancipation. In Syria and Iraq following the Baathist “revolutions” of the 1950s, women were granted political and social rights and encouraged, especially in Iraq, to utilize state-sponsored educational facilities. Nasserism as a reformist and developmentalist philosophy created unprecedented educational and employment opportunities for women in Egypt. In Iran women were granted the right to vote in 1963, and in 1967 the Pahlavi state introduced the Family Protection Act, which limited polygamy, allowed women to initiate divorce, and increased their child custody rights after divorce or widowhood.

Although male reformers have been instrumental in changing laws pertaining to women, women activists have been crucial agents themselves of legal and political change. In the early twentieth century, well-known women activists included Egypt’s Hoda Sharawi, who formed the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1923 and dramatically threw her veil into the sea; Turkey’s Halide Edip (1885–1964), a nationalist who had served in Mustafa Kemal’s forces; Iran’s Qurra Tul Ayn, the famous Bahai’s leader who fought in battles and caused a scandal in the 1840s by going unveiled; and Sedigheh Dowlatabadi, who, like Qurra Tul Ayn, was a fierce nationalist opposed to concessions to the British and publisher of the short-lived Zaban-e Zamin (“Women’s Tongue”). Since then, women in the Middle East, like women in other countries, have been engaged in all manner of political manifestations: Reform movement, anticolonial struggles, rational liberation movements, anti-imperialist struggles, religious movements, bread riots, street demonstrations, and so on. Their formal political participation has not been as extensive as that of men because they have been unfairly handicapped by existing custom and law. But precisely because of this handicap, their participation in political movements must be considered remarkable. In some cases, as a direct result of their involvement in a movement, women’s legal status improved. In other cases, women’s political activities had little or no bearing on their subsequent legal status and social positions; if anything, their legal status in fact diminished. It is essential to recognize that women in the Middle East have been actors in political movements, that these movements have had a variable effect on their social positions, and that gender and the woman question have been central features of political movements, reforms, and revolutions.

In their book Female Revolt, Chafetz and Dworkin state that “independent women’s movements are totally absent in the Middle East.” This is rather an exaggeration, for independent women’s movements have been especially persistent in Egypt (see Chapter 5). It is also surprising that Chafetz and Dworkin nowhere mention the strong opposition mounted by women against the Khomeini regime in 1979 and the many independent women’s groups that emerged that year (see Chapter 6). There is also an independent Iranian feminist movement in exile, with a number of journals, the most lively being Nimeh-ye Digar, published in the United States. And in Algeria an independent women’s movement first emerged in the early 1980s in opposition to the state’s draft bill on a Muslim family code, subsequently after the political opening of 1988, and especially since the 1990 electoral victory of the Islamist organization Front Islamique du Salut.

This chapter will not describe the many political movements in which Middle Eastern women have participated. The purpose of this chapter is to examine a number of revolutionary movements in which the woman question figured prominently and as a result of which women’s legal status and social positions underwent considerable change. Two sets of cases are examined. In one, national progress and societal transformation were viewed by the leadership as inextricably bound up with equality and the emancipation of women. I call this the Women’s Emancipation model of revolution. Such movements occurred within the context of the struggle against feudalism and backwardness and were in some cases inspired by socialist ideals. Education, employment, and unveiling were encouraged as a way of integrating women into the development of the country and thereby accelerating the process of social change. The Middle Eastern cases considered here are the radical Kemalist reforms in Turkey during the 1920s; the 1967 revolution in South Yemen and reform of family law in what came to be called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen; and the April 1979 Iran Revolution in Afghanistan, which sought to implement a controversial decree pertaining to marriage and the family. In the second set of cases, the leadership regarded cultural identity, integrity, and cohesion as strongly dependent upon the proper behavior and comportment of women, in part as a reaction to colonialist or neocolonialist impositions.
Veiling, modesty, and family attachment were encouraged for women. I call this the Woman-in-the-Family model of revolution. The two Middle Eastern cases considered here are the Algerian Revolution and the period following independence in 1962; and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent issue of veiling.

Quite apart from what this examination tells us about the varied positions of women and the role played by states in legitimizing gender in the Middle East, this chapter underscores the centrality of gender and the strategic role of the women question in sociopolitical change processes. As such it offers theoretical lessons of a wider relevance regarding political battles and the reproduction of state power.

Bringing Women into the Study of Revolution

Feminists and social scientists of gender from across the disciplines have examined some of the ways women affect and are affected by national, ethnic, and state processes. Some scholars of the French Revolution have examined how gender was constructed in the political discourse and discovered the legal disfranchisement and exclusion of women based on the "natural fact" of sexual difference.5 Unlike standard studies on revolution, feminist scholarship has been especially attentive to the theme of women and revolution. Silan Reynolds makes the interesting point that the participation of women as mothers and food distributors has a profoundly legitimizing effect on revolution—at least in its early stages.6 In social science studies of revolution, however, gender has yet to be treated systematically in the causes, course, or even outcomes of revolutions, despite the fact that the women question has been so closely entangled with the entire course of revolutions.7 In the sociology of revolution, gender, unlike class or the state or the world system, is not seen even as a constitutive category.8

Let us begin this discussion of women and revolutionary change by defining revolution. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "a complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it; a forcible substitution of a new ruler or form of government." As Kimmel notes, this definition implies that revolutions take place on the political level. Other definitions cite the use of violence, as in Samuel Huntington's description of revolution as "a rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, government activity, and policies." More than anyone else, Theda Skocpol has insisted upon the structural features of revolutionary causes and outcomes. She defines social (as distinct from the more limited political) revolutions as "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structure; they are accompanied and in part carried through by class based revolts from below." The definition by John Dunn includes the purposive dimension of revolutions: "a form of massive, violent, and rapid social change. They are also attempts to embody a set of values in a new or at least renovated social order."9 Finally, Perez Zagorin's definition is perhaps most useful for our present study, as it combines political change, attempts at social transformation, and concepts of the ideal society:

A revolution is any attempt by subordinate groups through the use of violence to bring about (1) a change of government or its policy, (2) a change of regime, or (3) a change of society, whether this attempt is justified by reference to past conditions or to as yet unattained future ideal.10

Let us agree, then, that revolutions are attempts to rapidly and profoundly change political and social structures; they involve mass participation; they usually entail violence and the use of force; they include notions of the "ideal" society; and they have some cultural reference points. Let us also note that revolutions have thus far occurred in societies undergoing the transition to modernity. The major theories of revolution—Marxist class analysis, relative deprivation, and resource mobilization—link revolution to the dynamics and contradictions of modernization.11 Certain conditions are necessary for the seizure of state power and the successful transformation of social structures, but these conditions vary, particularly over historical eras and types of societies (that is, causes of the Iranian Revolution are necessarily different from causes of the Bolshevik Revolution, and of course their outcomes completely diverge).

Revolutionary programs are not always fulfilled, and the intentions of the revolutionary leadership and state may be subject to various constraints, such as poor resource endowments, civil war, a hostile international environment, or external intervention. There is increasing consensus among students of revolution that in addition to the state, class conflict, resource bases, and the world system, cultural dynamics also should be investigated. That is, because of the complexity of causality, revolutions should be explained in terms of the interaction of economic, political, and cultural developments within national, regional, and global contexts.12 However, what the study of revolution has not yet considered systematically is the prominent position assumed by gender—the position of women, family law, the prerogatives of men—in the discourse of revolutionaries and the laws of revolutionary states. Yet, as mentioned above, outside of the sociology of revolution, a separate body of prolific research on the position of women in revolutionary Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Iran, and elsewhere strongly suggests that gender relations constitute an important part of the culture, ideology, and politics of revolutionary societies.

This chapter is in part an initial attempt to use gender as a constitutive
evolved the most democratic provisions of the laws on family life, restoring patriarchal authority.

Harriet Applewhite and Darlene Levy describe the crucial participation of women of the popular classes during the spring and summer of 1792, a period of acute military/political crisis in Paris and throughout France. Their participation in armed processions was tolerated, if not positively encouraged and protected, by Girondin authorities such as Jérôme Pétion, the mayor of Paris, for its potential to co-opt key elements of the armed force and to apply collective pressure on both the national legislature and the royal executive. The marches reached intersectionary proportions on June 20, when the thousands of men and women hastened the erosion of the constitutional monarchy. Finally, on August 10, 1792, the monarchy was brought down and a republic established. Both supporters and opponents of these fully mobilized democratic forces were sensitive to the strategic significance of women’s involvement in these armed marches. According to Applewhite and Levy: "Revolutionary leaders exploited women’s presence to create a gendered image of a national alliance of comrades in arms, mothers, sisters, and children. Authorities on both sides argued that it was extraordinarily difficult if not impossible to exercise excessive force effectively; they strongly implied that these armed families of sectionnaires constituted an insuperable popular force." 16

The women who participated in the armed processions of 1792—women who bore weapons, shouted slogans, displayed banners, forged ties with National Guard battalions, demonstrated their solidarity with the passive male citizenry of the sections, and identified themselves as the sovereign people in arms—contributed to mobilizing the forces that democratized principles of sovereignty and militant citizenship. Such acts were necessary to the struggle for democratization but not sufficient to break through gender-based limitations on the meaning of political democracy. Authorities such as Pétion, who honored, tolerated, or even orchestrated women’s involvement in the ceremonial and intersectionary movements of 1792, never intended to grant women the expanded political agency under the republic. In the autumn of the following year, Jacobin leaders who, during their struggle against the Girondins, had encouraged the organized militancy of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women, did not hesitate to block women’s political clubs when women’s activism began to threaten their power base.

Robert Darnton notes that at the height of the French Revolution, virtue was the central ingredient of the new political culture. But to the revolutionaries, virtue was virility. At the same time, the cult of virtue produced a revalorization of family life. Darnton explains that the revolutionaries took their text from Rousseau and sermonized on the sanctity of motherhood and the importance of breast-feeding. "They treated reproduction as a civic duty and excoriated bachelors as unpatriotic." 17 Banners and slogans

The French Revolution

That the French Revolution was an event of world historical significance is uncontested. Even before the 1840s, Marx was well aware that the French Revolution had become a representative event destined to be played out not once, but again and again. Elements of its progressive discourse are found in many subsequent revolutions in Europe and in the Third World. Popular sovereignty, civil liberty, equality before the law—these are among the rich legacy of the French Revolution, itself a product of the Enlightenment. But feminist scholars have argued that women were the marginalized Other in the development of the liberal democratic state. Bonds between men were constituted in opposition to women. In Western societies the division between the public sphere of state and civil society was conceptualized in opposition to the family, which was constructed as a natural and private institution headed by a man. 12 Even champions of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution must concede that the women question represents a serious drawback. 14

What was the gender dynamics of the French Revolution? Reynolds cites Mary Wollstonecraft to the effect that in the minds of many of the French revolutionaries, women were associated with weakness, corruption, frailty, and specifically with the court and the ancien régime. Indeed, under the ancien régime, certain privileged women of all three estates took part in the preliminary voting for the Estates General of 1789, which may explain in part why the French republicans did not extend the new liberties to women. 13 On the other hand, with the collapse of the Church’s authority, the revolutionaries sought a new moral basis for family life counterposed to that of the old regime. They made divorce possible, they accorded full legal status to illegitimate children, and they abolished primogeniture. They also abolished slavery and gave full civil rights to Protestants and Jews. But it is important to note that the emerging political culture of the French Revolution was rather biased in favor of men. Subsequently, Napoleon...
proclaimed: "Citizeness! Give the Fatherland Children!" and "Now is the time to make a baby." Motherhood had a certain legitimacy that unmarried women did not enjoy. The Reign of Virtue involved an ideal of women as passive nurturers: Women should bear children for the revolution and sacrifice them for France. He observed the active woman from the revolutionary club, describing them as "unmarried" and "sterile as vice." In contrast, Sheila Rowbotham writes that the action of women in the crowd over prices or in pushing for a part in popular sovereignty hinted at an active creation of women's roles, while Claire Lacombe attempted to appropriate revolutionary virtue for an extension of the power of the left-wing women. The deposition of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women that came to the National Convention to protect the ban on their organization described the Society as "composed in large part of mothers of families." 18

Although Lynn Hunt's study does not focus on gender, she argues that in the French Revolution the radical break with the justification of authority by reference to historical origins implied the rejection of patriarchal models of authority. On the republic's official seal, in engravings and prints, and in the tableau vivant of the festivities, feminine allegorizations of classical derivation reappeared representations of the king. These female figures, whether living women or statues, always sat or stood alone, surrounded but often by abstract emblems of authority and power. The republic might have her children and even her masculine defenders, but there was never a mother present. In the early years of the French Revolution, the symbol of the republic was Marianne.

Eventually Marianne was replaced by Hercules, a distinctly virile representation of sovereignty and its image with connotations of domination and subjugation. The introduction of Hercules served to distance the deputies from the growing mobilization of women. For both the Jacobin leaders and their sans-culottes followers, politics was a quarrel between men. 19 On the grounds that women's active participation would lead to "the kinds of disruption and disorder that hysteria can produce," the convention outlawed all women's clubs as the end of October 1793. The Jacobin Chasnette said, "The sans-culotte had a right to expect his wife to run the home while he attended public meetings: hers was the care of the family, hers was the full extent of her civic duties. If the revolution had been female, the republic was to be male. The founding of the republic legitimized male power and banned women from the political stage.

What was to be the place of women in the new society? According to the Jacobins, the state would assign her functions to her to begin the education of men, to prepare the minds and hearts of children for the exercise of public virtue, to direct them easily in life towards the good, to elevate their souls, to educate them in the cult of liberty—such are their functions after household duties... When they have carried out these duties they will have deserved well of the fatherland. 20 In other words, the French woman was not a citizen but the chief source of civic education, responsible for the socialization of children as republican virtues. As we shall see, the Iranian case is very similar.

"My poor sex," wrote feminist playwright Olympe de Gouges. "The women who have gained nothing from the Revolution!" Her cri de coeur that the advancement of men in the French Revolution had been accomplished at the expense of women suggests interesting theoretical possibilities, including an analogy with André Gunter Frank's development/underdevelopment thesis (whereby the two processes are symbiotic) or, perhaps more aptly, with Hegel's master/slave template.

The exclusion of women from the construction of the republic, their relegation to the sphere of the family, and their education in Catholic schools (until the 1850s) made them especially vulnerable in the patriarchal politics of the Second and Third Republics. The association of women with cultural and political conservatism led to their exclusion from the "universal suffrage" of 1848. As Michelet put it, giving women the vote would mean "giving thousands of votes to the priests." 21 This argument peaked under the Third Republic (1870-1940) and was shared by all anticlerical parties. Not until after World War II did women in France obtain the right to vote.

The Bolshevik Revolution

In contrast to the Woman-in-the-Family model of revolution as represented by the French Revolution, the Women's Emancipation model constructs women as part of the productive forces, to be liberated from patriarchal controls expressly for economic and political purposes. Here, the discourse strengthens sexual equality with sexual difference. The first example historically of such a movement is the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, which remains the avant-garde revolution par excellence, more audacious in its approach to gender than any revolution before or since.

With the onset of World War I, women had entered production in greater numbers, and by 1917 one-third of Petrograd's factory workers were women. The Bolsheviks published a paper for women workers, Rabotnitsa, and encouraged women to join factory committees and unions. Split over the question of organizing women, the party moved steadily in 1917 toward a policy of separate organizations for them. Support for the Bolsheviks, in turn, grew among laundresses, domestic servants, restaurateurs, and textile workers, and soldiers' wives. Although the party was theoretically opposed to separate organizations for women, in practice Rabotnitsa's success resulted in the organization of the Petrograd Conference of Working Women in November 1917 and the formation of the Zhenshchiny, or women's department, within the party in 1919.25
Under Alexandra Kollontai, people's commissar for social welfare, labor legislation was passed to give women an eight-hour day, social insurance, pregnancy leave for two months before and after childbirth, and time at work to breast-feed. It also prohibited child labor and night work for women. The early months of the revolution also saw legislation to establish equality between husband and wife, civil registration of marriage, easy divorce, abolition of illegitimacy, and the wife's right not to take her husband's name or share his domicile. Under Kollontai's directorship in particular, the Zhenotdel saw itself as a force for women's interests and the transformation of society. In Central Asia it organized mass unveilings of Muslim women and ran literacy classes. (As we shall see below, this was attempted fifty years later in South Yemen and in Afghanistan.) All these developments followed from the view that the emancipation of women was an essential part of the socialist revolution, something to be accomplished through "the participation of women in general productive labor" and the socialization of domestic duties. Lenin sometimes expressed his views on the subject of women, revolution, and equality in rather forceful terms:

"Woman continues to be a domestic slave, because petty housework draws, strangles, stifles and degrades her. Chains her to the kitchen and to the nursery, and wastes her labor on barrenly unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, mutilating and crushing drudgery. Enlightenment, culture, civilization, liberty—in all capitalist, bourgeois republics of the world all these fine words are combined with extremely infamous, disgustingly filthy and beastly coarse laws in which woman is treated as an inferior being, laws dealing with marriage rights and divorce, with the inferior status of a child born out of wedlock as compared with that of a "legitimate" child, laws granting privileges to men, laws that are humiliating and insulting to women."

The Bolsheviks also stressed the need for political participation of women, as the following quote from Lenin reveals: "We want women workers to achieve equality with men workers not only in law, but in life as well. For this, it is essential that women workers take an ever increasing part in the administration of public enterprises and in the administration of the state."

The Bolsheviks took the initiative in calling the First Communist Women's Conference in 1920, and prepared the position paper for the occasion, Theses of the Communist Women's Movement. Apart from its commitment to the political equality of women and the guarantee of their social rights, the Theses included an attack on housework and "the domestic hearth." The document reflected theEngelsian view that female emancipation would be a twofold process, incorporating both the entry of women into the national labor force and the socialization of domestic labor. The document also reflected the views of the outstanding Communist women who contributed to its formulation, among them Alexandra Kollontai, Inessa Armand, and Clara Zetkin.

Like the French revolutionaries before them, the Bolsheviks strongly supported "free union" and therefore legalized divorce. But in other matters they parted company with the French revolutionaries. Debates on sexuality reflected the Bolsheviks' commitment to gender equality and their critique of the family. The liberation of peasant women could only come about through a massive change in the mode of production, as well as a revolutionary transformation of social values and practices. The implementation in the 1920s of the Land Code and the Family Code, with their emphasis on individual rights and freedoms—including women's rights to land and to maintenance—was an extremely ambiguous act that challenged centuries of patriarchal control. It also undermined the collective principle of the household, the very basis of peasant production, and was thus strongly resisted. In Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s, where there was virtually no industrial working class, Bolshevik strategies directed their campaigns at women because they were considered the most oppressed social category.

Despite the Zhenotdel's best efforts, material scarcity crippled the Bolshevik vision of liberation, although jurists and party officials maintained their commitments to the "withering away" of the family, and convocations such as the Women's Congress in 1927 showed the potential of an active socialist women's organization. This potential was cut short in the 1930s with the consolidation of the power of Stalin and his associates, who ushered in a more culturally conservative era, disbanded the Zhenotdel, ended open discussions of women's liberation, and resurrected the family.

The earlier critique of the family was replaced by a strong emphasis on the "socialist family" as the proper model of gender relations. Family responsibilities were extolled for men as well as for women. By this time, economic, political, and ideological factors had converged to undermine the early libertarian views. Yet it cannot be denied that gender relations were altered, and significantly, by conscious deed and were an integral part of the construction of the new social order, the new socialist economy, and the new political culture of the Soviet Union. Let us now turn to reforms, revolutions, and the woman question in the modern Middle East. As will be evident, they follow the two models described above.

The Tanzimat Reforms and the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of disintegration. It faced external pressure from the European powers who wished to expand their influence into the Middle East,
Internally, the pressure came from two sources: growing feelings of nationalism among the non-Turkish population of the empire (Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, and people of the Balkans) and a desire for modernization and democratic institutions on the part of the Turks themselves. Among the latter, the strongest influence came from the ideals of the French Revolution. The process of modernization along European lines had already begun in the late eighteenth century. During the first half of the nineteenth century, military officers were sent to France for training, and in Turkey two schools were established to produce civil servants. The wide-ranging reforms known as the Tanzimat (reorganization) began in 1839 under the rule of Abdul Majid and inaugurated Turkey's shift from theocratic suz'erat to modern state. The security of the subject's life, honor, and property was guaranteed, and fair public trials and a new penal code were instituted. The principle of equality of all persons of all religions before the law was considered a very bold move for the times. The tax structure was reformed, and a new provincial administration based on the centralized French system was set up. Primary and secondary state schools were established alongside the religious schools, and in 1847 the creation of a Ministry of Education effectively took away the ulama's power of sole jurisdiction over education. The reforms continued during the sultanate of Abdul Aziz and included the introduction of a new civil code in 1876, which, however, was based on the Sharia. In 1871 the American College for Girls was started, although for two decades it was restricted to Christians. The first Muslim girl to complete her studies there was Halide Edip, a future women's leader. But the trend had started, and many women educated in this manner were to make their mark as novelists and writers on women's emancipation. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, opposition to the sultan was manifested in the Young Turks movement, officially called the Committee of Union and Progress. One of the principal tenets of the Young Turks was the need for modernization; they were also unabashedly for Westernization. Closely linked to the need for modernization through Westernization was the emancipation of women. Jayawardena reminds us that the process of Europeanization was not only ideological; it also entailed the forging of economic links with the capitalist countries of Europe. Around this time, the writer and sociologist Ziya Gökcalp, who was often referred to as the theoretician of Turkish nationalism and was strongly influenced by the Comtean and Durkheimian tradition in French sociology, advocated equality in marriage and divorce and succession rights for women. World War I hastened the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of a new group from among the Young Turks. This faction advocated the building of a modern Turkish national state that was "republican, secular and non-imperialist." Mustafa Kemal, an army captain, set up a revolutionary government in Ankara in 1920, overaw a peace treaty with the British, and established the Turkish Republic in 1923, with himself as president and leader of the Republican People's Party. The Kemalist reforms were the most far-reaching in both intent and effect. Atatürk, as he came to be known, furthered the process of Westernization through economic development, separation of religion from state affairs, an attack on tradition, Latinization of the alphabet, promotion of European dress, adoption of the Western calendar, and the replacement of Islamic family law by a secular civil code. The influence of the French Enlightenment and anti-clericalism is clear in these reforms. By 1926 the Sharia was abolished and the civil and penal codes thoroughly secularized. Ziya Gökcalp urged the Turks, "Belong to the Turkish nation, the Muslim religion and European civilization." Atatürk distanced himself from Islam much farther than Gökcalp did. Where the Turkish reformers diverged from their French predecessors was on the woman question. Turkish women obtained the legal right to vote in 1934, many years before French women did. Unlike the French, for whom the emancipation of women was not on the agenda, a central element of the conceptualization of Turkish nationalism, progress, and civilization was "Turkish feminism"—the exact words of Gökcalp. Not only Atatürk and Gökcalp but also Kemalist feminists such as the nationalist fighter and writer Halide Edip and Atatürk's adopted daughter, Afsi Inan (author of The Emancipation of the Turkish Woman), played major roles in creating images of the new Turkish woman. According to Kanelliyotis, the new Turkish woman was a self-sacrificing "comrade-woman" who shared in the struggles of her male peers. She was depicted in the literature as an atavistic sister-in-arms whose public activities never cast any doubt on her virtue and chastity. Turkish national identity was "deemed to have a practically built-in sexual egalitarianist component." In this sense the image of the emancipated Turkish woman was in line with the "true" identity of the collectivity—the new Turkish nation.

Why was the question of women's rights so strategic to the self-definition of the Turkish reformers? It appears that Mustafa Kemal had been deeply impressed by the courage and militancy of Turkish women during the Balkan wars and World War I. As Jayawardena notes, Turkish women had taken up new avenues of public employment as nurses on the war fronts and had worked in ammunition, food, and textile factories, as well as in banks, hospitals, and the administrative services. Political events caused their involvement in military activities. The occupation of various parts of Turkey by European troops in 1919 aroused protests in which women joined, and women in Anatolia were part of Kemal's army, which had launched a war against the invaders. In his speeches in later years, Kemal constantly referred to the role played by Anatolian women in the nationalist
struggle. In a speech at Timur in 1923 he said, "A civilization where one sex is supreme can be condemned, there and then, as crippled. A people which has decided to go forward and progress must realize this as quickly as possible. The failure of our past is due to the fact that we remained passive to the fair of women." On another occasion, also in 1923, he said, "Our enemies are claiming that Turkey cannot be considered as a civilized nation because this country consists of two separate parts: men and women. Can we close our eyes to one portion of the group, while advancing the other, and still bring progress to the whole group? The road of progress must be trod by both sexes together, marching arm in arm."

This sentiment has parallels with one shared by a number of Turkish writers who exposed the harmful individual and national effects of the subordination of women. Various stories and essays depicted individual women who suffered from subjugation, children who suffered because of their mother's ignorance, households that suffered because women could not manage money properly. The solution to these individual and household problems was education for women. Other writings depicted women who descended into abject poverty when their husbands or fathers died. The solution to that particular problem was work for women. Other stories sought to show that society and progress suffered when women were kept illiterate and subordinated to men. Ziya Gökalp is a particular linked education and employment of women with the development of the country. One of his poems reads:

Women are also human beings, and as human beings They are equally entitled to the basic rights of human beings: education and enlightenment. So long as she does not work, she will remain unenlightened. Which means, the country will suffer. If she does not rise, the country will decline. No progress is complete without her contribution.

In answer to Kandiyoti's question in the title of an essay, "Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolic Figures?" one may conclude that to the Turkish reformers, the women of Turkey were both participants in the political struggles and symbols of the new Turkey. As Suna Kiliş argues, the Kemalists' hatred for, suspicion of, and experiences with the traditional order became the sources of the processes leading to the initiation of the Turkish Enlightenment. Women's rights and women's emancipation were integral parts of Turkey's Westernization plan. Kemal Atatürk viewed women's equality as men as part of Turkey's commitment to Westernization, secularization, and democracy.

A National Liberation, Revolution, and Gender in Algeria

The French took over Algeria in June 1830. In contrast to their colonial policy in Morocco after 1912 and Tunisia after 1882, the French made an attempt in Algeria to dismantle Islam, its economic infrastructure, and its cultural network of lodges and schools. By the turn of the century, there were upwards of half a million French-speaking settlers in Algeria.

European competition ruined most of the old artisan classes by 1930. Small shopkeepers such as grocers and spice merchants survived, but others suffered severely from the competition of the Petit Colone. Industrialization in Algeria was given a low priority by Paris during the interwar period. Local development and employment generation were severely hampered, and there was considerable unemployment and male migration. Fierce economic competition, cultural disrespect, and residential segregation characterized the French administration. In this context, many Algerians regarded Islam and the Muslim family law as sanctuaries from French cultural imperialism.

To many Algerian men, the unveiled woman represented a capitulation to the European and his culture; she was a person who had opened herself up to the prurient stares of the foreigners, a person more vulnerable to rape. The popular reaction to the Salat el-Djewani was a return to the land and to religion, the foundations of the old community. Islam became transformed, the patriarchal family grew in importance, and the protection and seclusion of women were seen by Algerians as increasingly necessary.

When the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) was formed, there was no provision for women to enjoy any political or military responsibilities. Nonetheless, military exigencies soon forced the officers of the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) to use some women combatants. Upwards of 10,000 women participated in the Algerian Revolution. The overwhelming majority of those who served in the war were nurses, cooks, and laquerosas. But many women played an indispensable role as couriers, and became the French rarely searched them. Women were often used to carry bombs. This practice recalls the function of women in the street processions of Paris in 1792. Among the heroines of the Algerian Revolution were Djamila Bouhired (the first woman sentenced to death), Djamila Bouazza, Jacqueline Guerroudj, Zahia Khaled, Baya Hochino, and Djelfer Akerou. Women who fought and did not survive the war of liberation included twenty-year-old Hassiba Ben Bouali, killed in the Casbah, and Djennet Hamidou, who was shot and killed as she tried to escape arrest. She was seventeen. Yamita Abed, who was wounded in battle, suffered a reputation of both legs. She was twenty. These Algerian women, like the women of Vietnam after them, are the stuff of legends.

One emancipatory development during the national liberation struggle
was the admittance of unmarried women into the ranks of the FLN and ALN and the emergence by default of voluntary unions (marriage without family arrangement) presided over by an FLN officer. (This was plagiarized depicted in a scene in Pentecovo's brilliant film Battle of Algiers.) Alya Baffoun notes that during this "rather exceptional period of struggle for national liberation," the marriage of Djumila Bouchrih to an "infidel" non-Muslim foreigner was easily accepted and assimilated by her community.41

After independence the September 1962 constitution guaranteed equality between the sexes and granted women the right to vote. It also made Islam the official state religion. Ten women were elected deputies of the new National Assembly and one of them, Fatima Khemisti, drafted the only significant legislation to affect the status of women passed after independence.42 In this optimistic time, when heroines of the revolution were being hailed throughout the country, the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA) was formed. Indeed, one consequence of the Algerian Revolution and of women's role in it was the emergence of the Moujahidines model of Algerian womanhood. The heroic woman fighter was an inspiration to the 1960s and 1970s generation of Algerians, particularly Algerian university women.43

But another, more patriarchal tendency was at work during and after the Algerian Revolution. One expression of this tendency was the pressure on women fighters during the liberation struggle to get married and thus prevent spurious talk about their behavior. Moreover, despite the incredible sacrifices of Algerian women, and although the female militants "acceded to the ranks of subjects of history," the Algerian Revolution has tended to be cast in terms of male exploits, and the heroic female feats have not received as much attention.44

Following independence, and in a display of authoritarianism, President Ben Bella proceeded to ban all political parties; he Federation of the FLN in France, which had advocated a secular state, had been dissolved; the new FLN general secretary, Mohammed Khider, had purged the radicals—who had insisted on the right of workers to strike—from the union's leadership. And of women, Khider said: "The way of life of European women is incompatible with our traditions and our culture. . . . We can only live by the Islamic morality. European women have no other preoccupations than the twist and Hollywood stars, and don't even know the name of the president of their republic."45 In a reversal of the political and cultural atmosphere of the national liberation struggle, "exacerbated patriarchal values" became hegemonic in independent Algeria. In this context, the marriage of another Algerian heroine, Daïla, to a foreigner was deemed unacceptable. Alya Baffoun reports that Daïla's brother abducted and confined her "with the approving and silent consent of the enlightened elite and the politically powerful."46

Thus, notwithstanding the participation of upwards of 10,000 women in the Algerian Revolution, their future status was already shaped by "the imperialist" needs of the male revolutionaries to restore Arabic as the primary language, Islam as the religion of the state, Algeria as a fully free and independent nation, and themselves as sovereigns of the family.47 This is why, pace the optimistic vision of Franz Fanon, the country's independence did not signify the emancipation of women. Indeed, the FLN organ, El Moudjahid, opposed the term emancipation (identified with the French colonizers) and preferred Muslim Woman—which in this context had a political rather than a religious meaning.48

In the 1960s Algerian marriage rates soared. In 1967 some 10 percent of Algerian girls were married at fifteen years of age; at twenty years of age, 75 percent were married. The crude fertility rate was 6.5 children per woman. The Roumeguère government's policy on demographic growth was predicated on the assumption that a large population is necessary for national power. It was, therefore, opposed to all forms of birth control unless the mother had already produced at least four children.49 By the end of the Roumeguère years in 1979, 97.5 percent of Algerian women were without paid work. (Some 45 percent of Algerian men were unemployed or underemployed.) The UNFA had become the women's auxiliary of the FLN, devoird of feminist objectives.

On the positive side, state-sponsored education has created a generation of Algerian women who could become a restive force for progressive social change in Algeria. These are the women who loudly and visibly challenged the Chadli government's conservative family code in 1982, who continued to protest it after it was passed in 1984, and who today are confronting the Islamist fundamentalist movement in Algeria. (See Chapter 5 for an elaboration.)

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

In November 1967 the National Liberation Front came to power after five years of guerrilla fighting and terminated 128 years of British colonial rule in South Yemen. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was born. In June 1969 the revolutionary government took a more radical turn that aimed at "the destruction of the old state apparatus," the creation of a unified, state-administered legal system, and rapid social structural transformation. Tribal segmentation and the local autonomy of ruling sheikhs, sultans, and emirs had resulted in a country devoid of a unified national economy, political structure, and legal system. Such a social order was seen by the revolutionaries as an obstacle to economic development and social reform. At the same time, it was clear that development and change required the active participation of women. Kin control over women and the practice of seclusion, consequently had to be transformed.
In this context the constitution of 1970 outlined the government's policies toward women, and a new family law was proposed in 1971 and passed in 1974.

Quite unlike the Algerian FLN, the National Liberation Front of Yemen described itself as "the vanguard of the Yemeni working class," and its official doctrine was inspired by the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Article 7 of the constitution, which described the political basis of the revolution as an "alliance between the working class, the peasants, intelligentsia and petty-bourgeoisie," went on to add that "soldiers, women, and students are regarded as part of this alliance by virtue of their membership in the productive forces of the people." The constitution recognized women as both "mothers" and "producers," consequently as forming part of the "working people." In addition to giving all citizens the right to work and regarding work as "an obligation in the case of all able-bodied citizens," the constitution called upon women not yet involved in "productive work" to do so.

According to the preamble of the family law, the "traditional" or "feudal" family is "incompatible with the principles and programme of the National Democratic Revolution... because its old relationships prevent it from playing a positive role in the building up of society." As Mantine Molyneux explains, the law began by denouncing "the vicious state of affairs which prevails in the family" and proclaimed that "marriage is a contract between a man and a woman who are equal in rights and duties, and is based on mutual understanding and respect." It established the principle of free-choice marriage; raised the minimum legal age of marriage to sixteen for girls and eighteen for boys; abolished polygamy except in exceptional circumstances such as barrenness or incurable disease; reduced the dower (mahr); stipulated that both spouses must bear the cost of supporting the family; ended unilateral divorce; and increased divorced women's rights to custody of their children.

As in Soviet Russia, family reform was seen simultaneously as a precondition for mobilizing women into economic and political activity and as an indispensable adjunct of both economic change and social stability. What was distinctive and especially problematic about the process in the PDNY was that improvements in women's social and legal status involved reforming codes that were derived from Islam and were considered to be of divine inspiration. The introduction of the new family law in the PDNY, as elsewhere (see the discussion of Afghanistan below), involved challenging both the power of the Muslim clergy and orthodox interpretations of Islam. After 1969 the government sought to curb the institutional and economic base of the traditional clergy and transferred its responsibilities to agencies of the state. Religious education in schools was made the responsibility of lay teachers. Kil, class, and tribal control over women were outlawed and to some degree delegitimized. As Mantine Molyneux has noted, women were interpolated in new ways—as workers, national subjects, political subjects—in order to help construct the new order. The rearticulation of gender was an integral part of the restructuring of state and society. Gender redefinition was both a reflection of the new regime's political agenda and the means by which it could establish its authority and carry out its revolution.

As with the Bolsheviks, the Yemeni revolutionaries encouraged women's entry into the political realm, and women were given the vote in 1970 when universal suffrage was implemented. According to Molyneux, a special effort was made to ensure that some women candidates ran for election in the first national poll of 1977. Women were also drawn into political activity through such organizations as the General Union of Yemeni Women, the party, neighborhood associations, and other mass organizations. In 1977 the women's union had a membership of 14,296, which included 915 women workers employed in factories and workplaces; 528 agricultural workers and members of co-ops and state farms; 253 employees of various government agencies; secondary school and university students; and housewives. The women's union became especially active in the literacy campaign and in the campaign to gain support for the family law. As mentioned above, the Yemeni family law was passed in 1974 following extensive debate in what was a very conservative society. The law restricted polygamy but did not ban it. Men and women had equal rights when it came to divorce, and indeed there was a rise in the number of divorces immediately after the law was passed because it had become easier for women. The family law also required both spouses' consent to the marriage; set a limit to the dower; stipulated that the cost of running the household must be shared between husband and wife; and favored the mother for custody of the children even if she remarried, although the court had to decide in the child's best interests. A women's conference was held in April 1984, a decade after the family law had been passed, to see whether it needed any changes. The conference concluded that while there was nothing wrong with the law as it stood, there were still some problems in implementation. The government, party, and women's union retained a commitment to integrate Yemeni women into public life. Here is how one activist described it:

We cannot speak of liberating women without making them participate in social life to convince them of their role in society. In our constitution we have included a commitment to the principle of women's liberation. It is women's right now to work in factories. By encouraging women to work in factories and to go to school we will achieve the right orientation. The state has also abolished the existence of women as a special stratum. No longer is the law or constitution discriminatory against women. If a woman wants to work in any sphere no one will stop her.
In fact, not all women were able to enter public life. Notwithstanding some socioeconomic development and expansion of state authority, the PDRY government could not achieve its vision of a literate and productive society and emancipated women citizens. South Yemen remained poor, and there was still a cultural stigma attached to women performing income-generating activities outside the home. Disagreements within the party and pressures from surrounding countries forced a change in the PDRY. By 1990 the PDRY merged with its northern half, the Republic of Yemen, which is conservative and tribal-dominated. A retreat on the woman question is inevitable.

A Revolution, Islamization, and Women in Iran

The Iranian Revolution against the Shah, which unfolded between spring 1977 and February 1979, was joined by countless women. Like other social groups, their reasons for opposing the Shah were varied: economic deprivation, political repression, identification with Islamism. The large street demonstrations included huge contingents of women wearing the veil as a symbol of opposition to Pahlavi bourgeois or Westernized decadence. As in Algeria and revolutionary France, the massive participation of women was vital to the success of the insurrection. Many women who wore the veil as a protest symbol did not expect hijab (veiling) to become mandatory. Thus when the first calls were made in February 1979 to enforce hijab and Ayatollah Khomeini was quoted as saying that he preferred to see women in modest Islamic dress, many women were alarmed. Spirited protests and sit-ins were led by middle-class leftist and liberal women, most of them members of political organizations or recently formed women’s associations. Limited support for the women’s protests came from the main political groups. As a result of the women’s protests, the ruling on hijab was rescinded—but only temporarily. With the defeat of the left and the liberals in 1980 and their elimination from the political terrain in 1981, the Muslims were able to make veiling compulsory and to enforce it strictly.

The idea that women had “lost honor” during the Pahlavi era was a widespread one. Anti-Shah oppositionists depicted the overtly made-up “bourgeois dolls”—television announcers, singers, upper-class women in the professions—of the Pahlavi era. As in Algeria, the Iranians in Iran felt that “genuine Iranian cultural identity” had been distorted by Westernization, or what they called ghishvandegi. The unveiled, publicly visible woman was both a reflection of Western attacks on indigenous culture and the medium by which they were effected. The growing number of educated and employed women threatened men, who came to regard the modern woman as the manifestation of Westernization and imperialist culture and a threat to their own manhood.64 Islamists projected the image of the noble, militant, and selfless Fatemeh—daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, earlier popularized by the late radical Islamic sociologist Ali Shariati—as the most appropriate model for the new Iranian womanhood.

It is necessary to point out that in the 1979–1980 period, the women’s movement, then quite dynamic, was bifurcated; there were pro-Khomeini and anti-Khomeini women, and even among Islamist women there were different perspectives on women’s rights issues, including the veil. Moreover, many women were comfortable with the veil because of the prevalence of male harassment of women in Western dress. During the 1960s and 1970s, when I was growing up in Tehran, just waiting for a taxi or shopping downtown entailed major battles with men, who variously touched, teased, made sexual remarks, or cursed. Women were fair game, and it is understandable that many would want to withdraw to the protective veil when in public. But the legal imposition of hijab was not about protecting women, and it was certainly not part of any struggle against male sexism: It was about negating female sexuality and therefore protecting men. More profoundly, compulsory veiling signaled the (re)definition of gender rules, and the veiled woman came to symbolize the moral and cultural transformation of society.

The full implications of the Islamic dress code are spelled out in a booklet entitled On the Islamic Hijab by a leading Iranian cleric, Murtaza Mutahhari, who was assassinated in May 1979. In the preface by the International Relations Department of the Islamic Propagation Organization, it is argued that Western society “looks at women merely through the windows of sexual passion and regards woman as a little being who just satisfies sexual desires… Therefore, such a way of thinking results in nothing other than the woman becoming a propaganda and commercial commodity in all aspects of Western life, ranging from those in the mass media to streets and shops.” Mutahhari himself writes:

If a boy and a girl study in a separate environment or in an environment where the girl covers her body and wears or make-up, do they not study better?… Will men work better in an environment where the streets, offices, factories, etc., are continuously filled with women who are wearing make-up and not fully dressed, or in an environment where these scenes do not exist?…

The truth is that the disgraceful lack of hijab in Iran before the Revolution is a product of the corrupt western capitalist societies. It is one of the results of the worship of money and the perversion of sexual fulfillment that is prevalent amongst western capitalists.75

The idea that women had lost their modesty and men had lost their honor during the Pahlavi era was widespread one. Aftabzadah recounts a conversation he had in early February 1979 with a striking worker named Alimard, who had just returned from Shah-er Now (the red-light district in
Colonialism was fully aware of the sensitive and vital role of women in the formation of the individual and of human society. They considered her the best tool for subjugation of the nations. ... In the underdeveloped countries ... women serve as the unconscious accomplices of the powers--that be in the destruction of indigenous cultures. So long as indigenous cultures persist in the personality and thought of people in a society, it is not easy to find a political, military, economic or social presence in society. ... And women is the best means of destroying the indigenous culture to the benefit of imperialism. ...

In Islamic countries ... Islamic belief and culture provide people of these societies with faith and ideals. ... Women in these societies are armed with a shield that protects her against the complexities aimed at her humanity, honor and chastity. This shield protects her veil. For this reason, in societies like ours, the most immediate and urgent task was seen to be her unveiling, that is, disarming woman in the face of all calamities against her personality and chastity. ... It is here that we realize the glory and depth of Iran's Islamic Revolution. This revolution transformed everyone, all personalities, all relations and all values. Women was transformed in this society so that a revolution could occur (emphasis added).59

There can be no doubt that gender relations and the question of women were among the central components of the political culture and ideological discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A Afghanistan: The Saar Revolution and Women’s Rights

The Afghan Revolution represents an extreme case illustrating the problems of implementing modernizing and socialist reforms in the face of poverty and underdevelopment, pre-capitalist structures, counter-revolution, and external intervention. This revolution had profound implications for the woman question.

In April 1978 the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP) seized power in what came to be called the Saar (April) Revolution and established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Soon after the PDP introduced rapid reforms to change the political and social structure of Afghan society, including partition of land tenure and gender relations—and this in one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. The government of President Noor Mohammad Taraki targeted the structures and relations of “tribal-feudalism” and enacted legislation to raise women’s status through changes in family law (including marriage customs) and policies to encourage female education and employment. As in other modernizing and socialist experiments, the woman question constituted an essential part of the political project. The Afghan state was motivated by a modernizing outlook and socialist ideology that linked Afghan backwardness to feudalism, widespread female illiteracy, and the exchange of...
The leadership resolved that women's rights to education, employment, mobility, and choice of spouse would be a major objective of the "national democratic revolution." The model of revolution and of women's emancipation was Soviet Russia, and the Saur Revolution was considered to belong to the family of revolutions that also included Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, the PDRC, and Ethiopia.

In addition to redistributing land, cancelling peasants' debts and mortgages, and taking other measures to wrest power from traditional leaders, the government promulgated Decree No. 7, meant to fundamentally change the institution of marriage. A prime concern of the designers of the decree, which also mandated other reforms, was to reduce material indebtedness throughout the country; they further meant to ensure equal rights of women with men. In a speech on November 4, 1978, President Taraki declared: "Through the issuance of Decrees No. 6 and 7, the hard-working peasants were freed from bonds of oppressors and money-lenders, ending the sale of girls for good as hereafter nobody would be entitled to sell any girl or woman in this country."

The first two articles in Decree No. 7 forbade the exchange of a woman in marriage for cash or kind and the payment of other prenuptial customs due to a bridegroom on festive occasions; the third article set an upper limit of 300 Afghanis (afis), the equivalent of $10, on the amount. President Taraki explained, "We are always taking into consideration and respect the basic principles of Islam. Therefore, we decided that an equivalent of the sum to be paid in advance by the husband to his wife upon the matrilineal amounting to ten 'dirhams' (traditional ritual payment) according to shariat be converted into local currency which is afis. 300. We also decided that marriageable boys and girls should freely choose their future spouses in line with the rules of shariat." 15

The legislation aimed to change marriage customs so as to give young women and men independence from their marriage guardians. Articles 4 to 6 of the decree set the ages of first engagement and marriage at sixteen for women and eighteen for men (in contrast to what happened in the Iranian case). The decree further stipulated that no one could be compelled to marry against his or her will, including widows. This last provision refers to the customary control of a married woman (and the honor she represents) by her husband and his agnates, who retained residual rights in her in the case of her widowhood. The decree also stipulated that no one who wanted to get married could be prevented from doing so.

Along with the promulgation of Decree No. 7, the PDPA government embarked upon an aggressive literacy campaign. This was led by the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW), whose function was to educate women, bring them out of seclusion, and initiate social programs. Throughout the countryside, PDPA cadre established literacy classes for men, women, and children in villages. By August 1979 the government had established 600 new schools. The PDPA's rationale for pursuing the rural literacy campaign with such zeal was that all previous reformers had made literacy a matter of choice; male guardians had chosen not to allow their females to be educated, and thus 99 percent of all Afghan women were illiterate. It was therefore decided not to allow literacy to remain a matter of (men's) choice, but rather a matter of principle and law. This was an audacious program for social change, one aimed at the rapid transformation of a patriarchal society with a decentralized power structure based on tribal and landed authority. Revolutionary change, state-building, and women's rights subsequently went hand in hand. The emphasis on women's rights on the part of the PDPA reflected (1) its socialist-Marxist ideology; (2) its modernizing and egalitarian outlook; (3) its social base and origins—the urban middle class, professionals, and those educated in the United States, USSR, India, and Europe; and (4) the number and position of women within the PDPA.

The PDPA was attempting to accomplish what reformers and revolutionaries had done in Turkey, Soviet Central Asia, and South Yemen and to carry out what earlier Afghan reformers and modernizers had tried to do. (See Chapter 7 for a full exposition.) But PDPA attempts to change marriage laws, expand literacy, and educate rural girls met with strong opposition. Decrees 6 and 7 deeply angered rural tribemen and the traditional power structure. In the summer of 1978, refugees began pouring into Pakistan, giving as their major reason the forcible implementation of the literacy program among their women. There was also universal resistance to the new marriage regulations, which, coupled with compulsory education for girls, raised the threat of women refusing to obey and submit to family authority. The attempt to impose a minimum age for marriage, prohibit forced marriage, limit divorce payments, and send girls to school inevitably aroused the opposition of Afghan men, whose male chauvinism is as massive as the mountains of the Hindu Kush," according to one account. 65

An Islamist opposition began organizing and conducted several armed actions against the government in the spring of 1979. By December 1979 the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the Soviet army intervened. To a great extent, then, the failure of the revolution was linked to its audacious policy on women.

In 1980 the PDPA slowed down its reform program and announced its intention to eliminate illiteracy in cities in seven years and in provinces in ten. Unlike Soviet Russia, Turkey, or Iran, the Afghan state was not a strong one, able to impose its will through an extensive administrative and military apparatus. As a result, it was far less successful than other revolutionary regimes in carrying out its program—in Afghanistan's case, land redistribution and women's rights. Nor did a dozen years of civil war and a hostile international climate provide conditions propitious for progressive social change. In 1987 the name Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was
changed to the Republic of Afghanistan and the liberation of women took a backseat to national reconciliation. In 1990 the PDPN changed its name to the Homeland Party, or Hizb-e Watan. Similarly, the party made constitutional changes, dropping clauses that expressed the equality of men and women and reinitating Muslim family law. In 1992 the whole experiment collapsed, and the mujahidin set up an Islamic regime. Their very first act was to make veiling compulsory.

### Revolution, State-Building, and Women

Revolutions are a special case of social change that attempts to rapidly transform political and economic structures, social and gender relations, and societal institutions to conform to an ideology. The twentieth century has been called the century of revolutions, and many Third World countries, including countries in the Middle East, have experienced revolutionary change. Where revolutions result in the emergence of strong, centralized states, as in Turkey, Iran, and Algeria, revolutionary or state-builders are more successful in implementing their vision of the ideal society. But where revolutions occur in underdeveloped areas, states are not strong enough to carry out their programs for rapid and radical social change, as was the case in Afghanistan and South Yemen. In all cases, however, gender plays a role in the course of revolution and in the programs of state-builders. Changes in gender relations, practices, and laws should be part of the explanation of the causes, preconditions, and outcomes of revolutions.

The nature of gender discourse (for example, the radical language of the Bolsheviks versus the moralist rhetoric of the Islamists in Iran—i.e., gender equality versus gender difference) reveals a great deal about the nature of the revolution and the regime. During periods of revolutionary transformation, changes in societal values and ideologies affect gender relations and vice versa. Laws about women are closely bound to the power of the state. That is why, to paraphrase Hasia Papachristou, states and movements raise the woman question even when it creates so much trouble.64

Beginning at least as early as Marianne in the French Revolution, the idealized woman has historically played a major role as a national or cultural symbol. During transitional periods in a nation's history, women may be linked to either modernity or tradition. The woman question may be framed in the context of modernizing projects or in tandem with religious and moral movements; it may be raised to legitimize women or to mobilize them toward specific ends. At times of regime consolidation and state-building, questions of gender, family, and male-female relations come to the fore. The state becomes the manager of gender. Cultural representations of women, and of course legislation on family law and women's rights, reflect the importance of gender in politics and ideology and signal the political agenda of revolutionaries and regimes. Whether political discourses support women's emancipation and equality or whether they glorify tradition, morality, the family, and difference, the point remains that political ideologies and practices are gendered and that social transformation and state-building entail changes in gender relations as well as new class configurations and property rights.

The twentieth century has seen two models of womanhood emerge in the context of societal reform and revolutionary change. One model, which I have called the Woman's Emancipation model, draws its inspiration from the Enlightenment, the socialist tradition, and the Bolshevik Revolution. This model emerges when revolutionaries target feudalism, tribalism, or backwardness and recognize the need to integrate women into programs for development and progress. The other archetype I called the Woman-in-the-Family model, and it occurs in cases of opposition to colonialist or neo-colonialist modes of control, where revolutionaries draw from their own cultural repertoire. The historical precursor of this model of gender outcomes is, ironically, the French Revolution.

As Jayawardena observes in her study of feminism and nationalism in the Third World, for modernizing states and revolutionary regimes of the first half of the twentieth century the image of the modern woman, unveiled, educated, and working in the public sphere, provided a potent symbol. Nationalism, state-building projects, and the emancipation of women were of a piece. The modern woman who cut her hair, worked outside the home, and was accepted, at least on paper, as a full citizen was associated with progress and modernity, as in Russia and Turkey (and later in China). As I have shown in this chapter, more recent extensions of the earlier model of societal transformation and women's emancipation were the revolutionary aims of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

A second pattern of revolution and gender emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. With the rise of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movements, the modern woman came to be viewed with ambivalence, especially if she was associated with the culture of the colonialists and imperialists. We have seen in this chapter that in the Algerian and Iranian revolutions, the modern, unveiled woman was associated with social danger, moral decay, and imperialist culture. For “freedom fighters” who were staunchly opposed to modernizing projects, such as the Afghan mujahidin, the image of the modern woman is anathema. Elsewhere, at a time of economic difficulties, social uncertainties, and confrontations with the West, the image of the traditional woman seems to promise a return to a comfortable, stable, and idyllic past; she is seen as the repository of old values and ways of life and is linked to a more “genuine” cultural identity. The modern woman is taken to be representative of everything that appears threatening in the new and quickly changing world, of alien cultures and
external subjugation. This perception explains why not all revolutions in the latter half of the twentieth century have had favorable outcomes for the status of women.⁴⁵

Maxine Molyneux has argued that when revolutionary governments set about reforming the position of women in the first period of social and economic transformation, they tended to focus on three goals: (1) extending the base of the government’s political support; (2) increasing the size or quality of the active labor force; and (3) helping ensure the family’s security. The process of social reproduction. In all the cases examined here, Molyneux’s third factor was present. But the first and second factors are present only in the cases of modernizing, developmentalist states—those following what I have called the Women’s Emancipation model of revolution—whether guided by socialist ideology (as in the case of South Yemen and Afghanistan) or bourgeois ideology (as in the case of Turkey). For the revolutionary leaders in Algeria or Iran, integrating women into the labor force to increase its size (which was not a goal) or these labor surplus countries) or its quality (which should have been a goal but was not) was clearly not an objective. Rather, their keen desire to restore cultural authenticity, religious integrity, and national traditions, which they felt colonization or imperialism had distorted, led to the policy of family attachment rather than labor attachment for women.

In all the cases reviewed—Turkey, Algeria, South Yemen, Iran, and Afghanistan, and, of course, the French and Russian revolutions—the woman question figured prominently in political discourse, state ideologies, and legal policies. Gender relations and the position of women have figured prominently in other revolutionary movements as well, as Table 3.1 shows. The outcome of the woman question is determined by both structure and agency, as well as by economic, political, and ideological factors: the prevailing material conditions of social life, the international environment, the nature of the revolutionary leadership and its social program, the extent of women’s participation in the revolution, the degree to which women are organized and capable of articulating their interests, and the ability of the revolutionaries to articulate its vision of liberation and social transformation. Concepts of the ideal society invariably entail concepts of the ideal woman. The formation of national identity is both a political and a cultural exercise; as such, conceptions of gender are an integral part of the process of identity and state formation. Political-cultural projects, and the positions of women, are inextricably linked. Transforming society and transforming women are consequently two sides of the same coin.
December 3, 1990. I am grateful to the director-general, M. Abderrahim Chaouki, for the opportunity to interview the women employees and especially grateful to M. Abdelhay Boushabba of the national staff of UNIFEM for arranging the site visit and the interviews.


I am grateful to John Foran for pointing out that gender is treated in Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), which I had not seen at the time of this writing.


16. Terry Boswell, World Revolutions and Revolutions in the World-System," in Terry Boswell, ed., Revolution in the World-System (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 1-18. Here I refer to twentieth-century revolutions. The continuous debate within the scholarly community on the causes and outcomes of the French Revolution, initiated by François Furet's revisionist historiography, is somewhat separate. As regards the changes in Eastern Europe (the "1989 revolutions") and the former Soviet Union, whether or not these countries experienced a revolution in the sociological sense, and the nature of this revolution, remains a matter of debate and requires further research. It is likely that our definition of revolution may need to be revised to account for the changes in the former socialist societies, particularly with regard to the generally nonviolent nature of the collapse of the communist states. And although these societies were not "modernizing" societies, they seem to have been rather hard hit by the vagaries of the world system, which would suggest that class conflict and world-systemic imperatives may explain the
causes of the 1989 revolutions. But certainly what they have in common with earlier revolutions and with the discussion in this chapter is a gender dimension distinctly similar to the “Woman-in-the-Family” model of revolution.


15. Eric Hobsbawm called the woman question “the Achilles heel of the Enlightenment” in a personal communication, Helsinki, August 9, 1990.


19. It is Rousseau’s contention that women’s role in the French Revolution, and in particular left-wing women such as Claire Lacombe and the sanzicultural women in the club and society, were the precursors of the socialist women of 1830-1848. See “Women in Movement: Feminism and Social Action,” Manuscript, 1992, pp. 19-27.

20. Quoted in Reynolds, Marriane’s Citizens?” p. 3.


27. Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, p. 25.


29. Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, p. 29.


32. Cited in Kandiyoti, ibid., p. 141.

33. Kandiyoti, ibid., p. 142.

34. Quoted in Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, p. 36.


37. Dogramaci, ibid., p. 127.


50. Molyneux, ibid., pp. 161-162.


52. Molyneux, ibid., p. 157.


64. Hanna Papaske, “Why Do Regimes Raise the Woman Question Even When It Creates So Much Trouble?” Comments prepared for MIT seminar on the State and Restructuring of Society in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (March 20, 1989).
65. It should be noted that these comments apply equally well to the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and perestroika in the former Soviet Union, which demonstrate a reactionary position on gender and on women’s role within the society and the family in the late twentieth century is not limited to Muslim countries. For an elaboration, see Val Moghadam, ed., Privatization and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; The Gender Dimension (Boulder: UN/GIZ/REDA, Research for Action Series, 1992), and forthcoming from Val Moghadam, ed., Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

Chapter 4


6. See, for example, Linda Gordon, Hopes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence (London: Virago, 1980). See also John Boswell, The Kindness of Strangers. Boswell’s study locates the phenomenon of child abandonment in patria potestas, the Roman-derived paternal authority. Gordon’s study of wife and child abuse in Boston is highly critical of the patriarchal family and the pernicious effects of the father. Needless to say, both studies recognize extra-family causes of abandonment and abuse, such as food scarcity, disease, poverty, and unemployment.


